Keep a close eye on 911-Commission
Judging by recent chatter from the 911 commission, it looks like they are close to a final report. After the hours upon hours of testimony its panelists absorbed, the commission has amassed a wealth of information, some helpful, some incriminating, some appalling, from 'witnesses' who were by turns accusatory, apologetic, defensive, or remarkably forthright. But what will come of all this information remains to be seen. Some points, however, can probably be guessed at with some degree of accuracy.
As I see it, the commission has two possible interpretations it can put on the often damning revelations it has been privy to: it can either chalk them up to failures - meaning mistakes, blunders, problems with communication, too much red-tape, etc. - or to willful obstruction and perhaps criminal negligence leading to the attacks of September 11. If the commission takes the first angle, then we are all in trouble, as its 'recommendations' are likely to point to a total consolidation of intelligence-gathering organs; this to avoid any more breakdowns in communication, of course. But it is also perfectly possible, even likely, that the September 11 attacks didn't happen because of some strategic or administrative blunder, or a lack of capacity to anticipate or even imagine such attacks; or to carry out the day to day work of analyzing intelligence. September 11 could have been the result of actions willfully taken or willfully not taken by the present Bush administration. In this case, the findings of the commission would, one hopes, place blame where it is due, for the benefit of the aggrieved families and the American public at large, in whose name these investigations have been conducted. Findings with this slant could well (and rightly) point to needed structural changes in the intelligence-gathering community but the focus would be on those in the Administration whose task it was to protect the American people and who were derelict in their duties to the point of criminal culpability.
As I see it, the commission has two possible interpretations it can put on the often damning revelations it has been privy to: it can either chalk them up to failures - meaning mistakes, blunders, problems with communication, too much red-tape, etc. - or to willful obstruction and perhaps criminal negligence leading to the attacks of September 11. If the commission takes the first angle, then we are all in trouble, as its 'recommendations' are likely to point to a total consolidation of intelligence-gathering organs; this to avoid any more breakdowns in communication, of course. But it is also perfectly possible, even likely, that the September 11 attacks didn't happen because of some strategic or administrative blunder, or a lack of capacity to anticipate or even imagine such attacks; or to carry out the day to day work of analyzing intelligence. September 11 could have been the result of actions willfully taken or willfully not taken by the present Bush administration. In this case, the findings of the commission would, one hopes, place blame where it is due, for the benefit of the aggrieved families and the American public at large, in whose name these investigations have been conducted. Findings with this slant could well (and rightly) point to needed structural changes in the intelligence-gathering community but the focus would be on those in the Administration whose task it was to protect the American people and who were derelict in their duties to the point of criminal culpability.
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